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A QUESTION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
An interesting question which has not yet been determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States, is whether the Federal
statutes provide any means by which a corporation which has
been indicted in one of the Federal districts, but is not found
within that district, may be removed thereto for trial upon the
indictment.
Under the penal provisions of the postal laws of the United
States and of the Sherman Act and Interstate Commerce Act,
and perhaps under other Federal criminal statutes, an indictment
may be returned against a corporation in a district court of the
United States in a district in which the corporation has neither
an office, an agency nor property, and in which it is not engaged
in the transaction of any business. Section 3894 of the Revised
Statutes, which is the section prohibiting the use of the mails for
lotteries, gift concerts or other similar enterprises, makes the
offense one, either where the letter is mailed, or where it is de-
livered to the person to whom it is addressed and expressly
enacts that the prosecution may be had in the district in which the
publication was mailed, or to which it is carried by mail for de-
livery, or at which it is caused to be delivered by mail to the
person to whom it is addressed.
In the Armour Packing Company case, 209 U. S., 56, the prose-
cution was based upon a charge that the Armour Packing Com-
pany had obtained transportation at less than the rates pre-
scribed by the published tariffs, and had thereby violated the
Act to Regulate Commerce. In that case it was contended that
the alleged offense was complete in the State of Kansas, where
the contract of carriage was made, and the transportation com-
menced, and that the prosecution could not be maintained in the
western district of Missouri. In support of this contention it was
earnestly urged that in so far as the Interstate Commerce Act
authorizes a prosecution outside of the district where the contract
for the carriage is made and where the carriage commences, it is
unconstitutional because of the requirement of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, that criminals be
prosecuted and punished in the State or district where they are
committed. The Supreme Court, sustaining Judge Smith Mc-
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Pherson who presided at the trial in the district court, in over-
ruling this contention, held that the crime consisted in receiving
the transportation at less than the tariff rates, and said:
"This is a single, continuing offense, not a series of offenses,
although it is continuously committed in each district through
which the transportation is received at the prohibited rate."
The jurisdiction, so far as the constitutional requirement is con-
cerned, depends upon "the locality of the offense, and not the
personal presence of the offender."
Three concrete cases involving an effort to remove a corpora-
tion from one district to another for trial have arisen, all of them
recently, one in the southern district of Iowa, and the others in
the western district of Tennessee-one for an alleged violation
of the postal laws, one for rebating in violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act, and one for conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
The Tennessee court held that it had the right to bring in the
foreign corporation by a summons; the Iowa court reached the
contrary conclusion. The question which it is proposed to con-
sider is which of these conclusions is correct.
The jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States ex-
tends only to persons and things within their respective districts.
This is a matter of purely statutory authority. It was at an early
day recognized that the Congress has the power to authorize pro-
cess of the district and circuit courts to run anywhere within the
jurisdiction of the United States. The policy has been, however,
to confine them rigidly to their respective districts and circuits,
with some few exceptions, immaterial here, such as subpoenas,
final process in favor of the United States, and process issued
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. It is held in numerous
cases, that in the absence of an express enactment by the Con-
gress, the process of these courts cannot run outside their terri-
torial jurisdiction.
An interesting case, showing the strictness with which this doc-
trine has been applied, is In re Anderson, 94 Fed., 487. A decree
had been entered by a United States Court in Tennessee, with
reference to certain lands lying on the border line between that
State and North Carolina, jurisdiction of which had at one time
been in dispute between the two States. Under a writ of pos-
session issued under this decree, a deputy marshal inadvertently
attempted to act while over the line in North Carolina, and was
committed on a charge of assault and other trespasses in that
State. The court refused him a writ of habeas corpus, holding
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that the marshal was protected by his process in Tennessee "but
not one inch beyond such district."
Another deputy United States marshal was sentenced by a.
Mississippi court on a charge of carrying concealed weapons. He
instituted a habeas corpus proceeding.' The facts were that while
temporarily in Mississippi, near the State line, the deputy learned
where a person for whom he had a warrant could be found in
Tennessee, on the other side of the boundary. He armed himself
and prepared to start in pursuit. Before starting the deputy was
arrested on the charge of carrying concealed weapons, but was
allowed to proceed upon his errand. The deputy arrested the of-
fender and subsequently returned to Mississippi, where he was
arrested and fined for the offense of carrying concealed weapons.
In holding that the deputy was not entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus, Justice Lamar, before whom the case was tried, says that
the deputy's contention
"overlooks the vital principle running through our laws (and
which is in fact admitted by the relator in another form) that,
subject to certain well-defined exceptions (not material to be
stated here) the authority of the United States marshals and
their deputies to act in an official capacity is confined to the re-
spective districts for which they have been appointed. Revised
Statutes, 787.' In this case the relator was a deputy United
States marshal for the western district of Tennessee, and the war-
rant which he had for the arrest of Bowers had been issued by
a United States commissioner for that district. No part of his
district extended into Mississippi. The warrant was effective only
in the western district of Tennessee.' Moreover, the official char-
acter of the relator could be recognized only in that district. Out-
side of that district, except in certain special cases not material in
this consideration, he was simply a private citizen, and, as such,
was amenable to the laws of the place where he chanced to be.
He could not serve the warrant outside of his district if he could
not do the main act connected with the service of the warrant
without his district, neither could he perform, outside of his dis-
trict, such incidental preliminary acts as are claimed in this case
to have been done in the line of his duty, and therefore in pur-
suance of the law."
Omitting further reference to the authorities enforcing the
general proposition that process of the district and circuit courts
is limited in its force to their respective territorial jurisdictions,
I Walker v. Lee, 47 Fed., 645.
2 Fletcher v. United States, 45 Fed., 213.
3 Tolland v. Sprague, 12 Pet., 3oo; Ex parte Graham, 3 Wash, C. C.,
456; 4 Wash, C. C., 2ii; Day v. Manufacturing Co., BlatchL, 628.
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the final inquiry is whether the Congress has by affirmative legis-
lation created an exception to this general rule by granting to
the several district courts the power to remove a corporation from
one district to another for trial. The only Federal statute re-
lating to this subject is the Act of 1789 as amended, which now
appears as Section 1oi4 of the Revised Statutes. This section is
as follows:
"For any crime or offense against the United States, the of-
fender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by
any commissioner of a circuit court to take bail, or by any chan-
cellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge
of common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other
magistrate, of any State where he may be found, and agreeably
to the usual mode of process against offenders in such State, and
at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned,
or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the
United States as by law has cognizance of the offense. Copies of
the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the clerk's
office of such court, together with the recognizance of the wit-
nesses for their appearance to testify in the case. And where any
offender or witness is committed in any district other than that
where the offense is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge
of the district where such offender or witness is imprisoned, sea-
sonably to issue, and of the marshal to execute, a warrant for
his removal to the district where the trial is to be had."
The provision for the removal of an offender is contained in the
last sentence of the section, which makes it the duty of the judge,
where the offender is imprisoned, to issue a warrant for his re-
moval to the district where the trial is to be had, and makes it the
duty of the marshal to execute this warrant.
The terms of this section negative its application to corpora-
tions. Its provisions for arrest, imprisonment and bail, clearly
can refer only to natural persons, and the requirements that the
judge of the district "where such offender is imprisoned" shall
issue, and the marshal shall execute, a warrant for his removal,
are essentially inapplicable to an artificial person.
In the two cases in Tennessee, where the court asserted this
power,, it is conceded that it cannot be deduced from this section.
The following excerpt is taken from the earlier case:
"Section 1014 of the Revised Statutes provides the method by
which a natural person, who may be indicted in the United States
court, may be brought from another district into the district
' United States v. Standard Oil Co., 154 Fed., 728, and United States
v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company, et al., 163 Fed., 66.
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wherein he is indicted for trial. But this statute is not effective
here. This defendant is a corporation. It cannot be taken into
custody and required to execute bond for its appearance, nor
on its refusal or failure to do so, be committed to jail. Indeed,
it can only appear before the court through its agent or attorney.
"In Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, Section 95oa, Par. 3, it
is said: 'A corporation is an intangible creature of the law, which
cannot be seized and held, or imprisoned, or hung like a human
being. Therefore the only method for obtaining the necessary
control of it is by notice served on its proper officer and steps to
force it to appear by attorney. For without an appearance there
can be no sentence; judgment by default being unknown in brim-
inal cases.'
"Since this defendant cannot be arrested and brought within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, as in the case of a natural
person, of necessity it must be brought by summons, if the court
obtains jurisdiction of it, unless it shall voluntarily appear."
The procedure adopted by the Tennessee court in its attempt to
secure jurisdiction was the issuance of a summons directing the
defendant to appear and answer the indictment. This summons
was served on the defendant in Indiana, the defendant having no
agency, business or property in Tennessee. The court pre-
dicated its authority to issue this summons upon Section 716 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, also a part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which is set out below:
"The Supreme Court, and the Circuit and District Courts shall
have power to issue writs of scire facias. They shall also have
power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute
which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective juris-
dictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law"'
There are a number of considerations which seem to demon-
strate that the conclusion of the court was unsound, .and that
there was no authority whatever for the issuance of such a sum-
mons:
(a) It was early decided and is settled doctrine that this sec-
tion cannot be invoked to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court.
Writs under it can be issued only in aid of a jurisdiction already
acquired. There are a number of authorities sustaining this
proposition.r
(b) The fact that the Congress has specifically legislated upon
this particular matter of extradition in Section 104, precludes
5McClurg v. Silliman, 6 Wheat., 6oo; Bath County v. Any, 13 Wall.,
244; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet., 524; McIntyre v. Wood, 7 Cranch,
5o4; In re Paquet, 114 Fed., 437.
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resort to the general provisions of Section 716. Both of these
sections were a part of the Act of 1789. If it had been the pur-
pose of the Congress to provide for the removal of corporations,
as well as natural persons, it is inconceivable that it would have
omitted all mention of this matter in the section devoted to this
subject, or that it would have contented itself with the very gen-
eral provision of Section 716. The affirmative legislation as to
this subject in Section 1014 defines what the Congress intended
and negatives the contention that its purpose was to grant other
powers not definitely expressed. To paraphrase the language of
Chief Justice Marshal 6 the affirmative description of the powers
of the court with reference to the removal of a defendant from
one district to another for trial, must be understood as prohibiting
the exercise of other powers than those described.
(c) This doctrine would authorize process in civil cases
throughout the United States. The language of Section 716 is
not limited to criminal cases. As a matter of fact, the vast ma-
jority of the writs issued by virtue of its authority have been
issued in civil suits. By the terms of the section, this power is
granted to both circuit and district courts. If the argument that
it operated to confer upon the district courts the power to issue
a summons running to a state outside of the district is sound by a
parity of reasoning, it conferred a like power upon the circuit
courts.
The argument by which the Tennessee court reaches its con-
clusion is not persuasive. In the opinion, the court after assert-
ing its jurisdiction over offenses against the United States, states
that nothing remains except to obtain jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. The opinion then proceeds:
"Since Congress has not specifically provided for the issuance
of the writ, nor the method of bringing defendants before the
court in this character of cases, and since it is necessary that such
writ issue to enable this court to exercise its jurisdiction, and
since the issuance of such writ is agreeable to the usages and
principles of law, I think that the process in this case is authorized
by Section 716, Revised Statutes.
"It would seem, that if the conclusion reached is not correct,
then the Standard Oil Company of Indiana can accept rebates or
concessions from every railroad company in each State of the
Union, except the State of Indiana, of which the defendant is a
citizen, and defy the courts beyond that jurisdicition, on the
6 United States v. More, 3 Cranch, i59.
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ground that no United States court outside the State of Indiana
is authorized to issue process to the district of Indiana, and cause
the same to be served upon the defendant, summoning it to ap-
pear before such court for trial. In other words, the Standard
Oil Company of Indiana, would be beyond the jurisdiction of
United States courts, except the United States courts for the dis-
trict of Indiana, and therefore immune from punishment for vio-
lating the law for which it is indicted in this case, unless that
punishment be imposed by a United States court for the district
of Indiana."
This is an argument ex necessitate, pure and simple. It justi-
fies the issuance of the writ upon the theory that it is necessary
that the court have this power, not upon any act of the Congress
granting this power. But what powers the Congress should have
vested in the court was beside the issue. The question before the
court for determination was whether the Congress had granted
this power, not whether it ought to have made such a grant. If
the Congress had erred, to quote from Justice Harlan in the
Northern Securities case:
"The remedy for the error and the attendant mischief is the
selection of new Senators and Representatives, who, by legislation,
will make such changes in existing statutes, or adopt such new
statutes, as may be demanded by their constitutents and be consis-
tent with law."
The case in the southern district of Iowa is not reported. It
arose subsequent to the Standard Oil Company case, and was a
prosecution for an alleged violation of a postal statute. After an
indictment had been found, an application was made for a sum-
mons requiring the defendant, a New Jersey corporation, to ap-
pear and plead to it. This application the court refused, de-
clining to follow the Tennessee decisions, and holding that inas-
much as there is no statute authorizing such a procedure, the
court was without jurisdiction to issue the writ.
The considerations to which reference has been made, seem to
point conclusively to the correctness of this decision of the Iowa
court. Section 716 does not confer upon the district courts of the
United States, power to issue process directed against foreign
corporations outside of their respective districts. It would seem
to be obvious that the Congress omitted to provide for the extra-
dition of corporations; this provision the courts may not supply,
and without such provision there is no method by which a foreign
corporation can be required to make an involuntary appearance
to an indictment found outside the district in which it is located,
or has an agency or business.
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It should not be inferred that the foregoing conclusion in-
volves failure or even substantial embarrassment in the prosecu-
tion of offenders against the Federal laws. Danger of a mis-
carriage of justice may be averted by commencing the prosecu-
tion against the offending corporation in a district in which it has
an agency, or in which its principal place of business is located.
The reason why, at the outset, no provision was made for the
removal of corporations from one district to another is not far to
seek. There was then no occasion for it, partly because of the
relatively insignificant part which corporations then played in
the business and commercial life of the country, and partly be-
cause at that time the occasion had not arisen for defining and
.punishing as crimes, many of the offenses to which reference has
been made.
In closing, it may not be amiss to call attention to the signifi-
cance of the fact that in the one hundred and twenty years which
have elapsed since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
there has developed no practical necessity for the removal of cor-
porations from one judicial district to another for trial. Notwith-
standing the notoriously bad repute in which corporations in gen-
eral are held by certain classes, certainly not unimportant in their
number, there could be no better demonstration that they have
in general been law abiding, at least so far as the Federal statutes
are concerned, than the fact that an experience of over a century
had not resulted in the enactment of an extradition law applying
to them. If experience had demonstrated the necessity for such
a law it would have been promptly enacted.
Nathaniel T. Guernsey.
